Cloud computing has become a revolutionary computing model which provides an economical and flexible strategy for resource sharing and data management. Due to privacy concerns, sensitive data has to be encrypted before being uploaded to the cloud servers. Over the last few years, several keyword searchable encryption works have been described in the literature. However, existing works mostly focus on secure searching using keyword and only retrieve Boolean results that are not yet adequate. On the other hand, poor-resources of mobile networks play an important role on all applications area nowadays. Mobile nodes mostly act as information retrieval end which make it important to address this problem. In this paper, we present a secure keyword search scheme based on the Bloom filter (SKS-BF), which enhances the system's usability by allowing ranking based on the relevance score of the search results and retrieves the top most relevant files instead of retrieving all the files. Further, the Bloom filter (BFs) can accelerate a search process involving a large number of keywords. Extensive experiments and network simulation confirm the efficiency of our proposed schemes.
. In this scheme, any user with the public key can write to the data stored on the cloud server, but only trusted users with the secret key can search.
The notion of secure ranked search over encrypted data was first proposed by Wang et al. [12] . [12, 26] allowed data users to search only with single keyword query and retrieve the top-k relevant documents. Cao et al. [27, 28] introduced the first privacy-preserving multi-keyword ranked search scheme, in which documents and queries are formed as vectors of dictionary size. With coordinate matching, the documents are ranked according to the number of matched query keywords. These techniques do not take the significance of the different keywords into consideration. Therefore, they are not precise enough. Orencik et al. [29] proposed a secure multi-keyword search scheme employing local sensitive hash (LSH) functions to collect similar documents. The LSH protocol is convenient for similar search, but cannot give an accurate ranking. Zhang et al. [30] introduced a method to deal with secure multi-keyword ranked search in a multiuser form. In this method, various data users use different secret keys to encrypt their keywords and documents while authenticated data users can query without knowing the keys of these various data users. The authors proposed an Additive Order Preserving Function to return the most relevant search results. Wang et al. [31] introduced a public-key searchable encryption method based on an inverted index. Their method preserves the high search efficiency inherited from the inverted index, while removing the onetime-only search limitation of the previous techniques. Recently, Chen et al. [32] presented a hierarchical clustering technique to support most search semantics and also to meet the demand for fast ciphertext search within a big dataset. Their technique clusters the documents based on the minimum relevance threshold, and then splits the resulting clusters into sub-clusters until the constraint on the maximum cluster size is reached.
The methodology of optimized routing for cloud-networks using ZRP (Zone Rout Protocol) aims at minimizing routing overheads and prevents redundancy on all nodes in zone by adopt-ing shortest distance between the nodes as the elected best path and discard other paths from the routing table [33] [34] [35] . Lee et al. [36] proposed a combined compression technique. It incorporates routing process with compressive sensing for energy aware data gathering in wire-less sensor networks. The Simulation results exhibit the electiveness of the proposed combined technique which outperform the standard compressed sensing. Many compression techniques had been invented to solve the energy limitation of mobile nodes, they vary upon compression level from link, data, and protocol's headers [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] .
PRELIMINARY 3.1. Inverted Index
Most current IR techniques [11] utilize an index of the document collection to speed up the search. The inverted index (also referred to as the postings document) is one of the most popular data structures used in information retrieval systems [42] . An inverted index includes multiple inverted lists. One inverted list stores a list of mappings from a keyword w to its corresponding set of document IDs that include this keyword. Additional information can be inserted in the inverted list, like the numerical statistics of the keyword (to support result ranking), each document in the inverted lists is assigned a numerical relevance score. Such scores are used to decide which document is more relevant to the corresponding keyword. The TFXIDF method is widely used to calculate the relevance scores. For the given word w and the document D, TF (term frequency) indicates the number of times in which w appears in the document D, while IDF (inverse document frequency) refers to the ratio of the whole number of documents in the collection to the number of documents that contain the keyword w. Among several TFXIDF formulas, we choose the following formula to calculate the relevance of the Document Fd with regards to the keyword w:
where w indicates the searched keyword, fd,w denotes the term frequency TF of keyword w in document Fd, and |Fd| is the length of the document Fd, obtained by counting the number of indexed terms, functioning as the normalization factor. The essential advantage of using an inverted index comes from its search efficiency, especially for a large volume of documents. The search process is performed on a much smaller document set, which comprises the inverted lists that correspond to the query keywords.
Complexity Assumptions
The symbol G is used to denote a group which is a set with some binary operation. Definition 3.1. The number of items in G is called the order of G. A group G is finite if the number of items is finite. The main groups used in this paper are Zn, Gx and Gy. Zn denotes the set of integers under addition modulo n, Gx is an additive group and Gy is the related multiplicative group. Both Gx and Gy are cyclic groups of large prime order r related to elliptic curves over finite fields.
We now review the bilinear pairing that plays a crucial role in building the efficient PEKS scheme, introduced in [6] . Definition 3.3. (Bilinear Pairing [43] ) Let Gx and Gy be two cyclic groups with a prime order r, v is a generator of Gx and Gy. Then we say ê: G x × G x → G y is a bilinear map if the following properties are satisfied: a) Bilinearity:
Below, we review the definition of the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problem associated with the bilinear pairings [43] . 
PROBLEM FORMULATION 4.1. System and Threat Model
Our scheme includes three different entities, a data owner DW, a cloud server CS, and data users DU. We suppose the authorization between the data owner and data users is appropriately done. DW has a collection of n data files FC= (f1, f2, …, fM) that he wants to outsource on CS in encrypted form. To do that, before outsourcing, DW will first build a Secure Searchable Index SSI from a set of m different keywords W= (w1, w2, …, wN) extracted from the file collection FC, and store both the index SSI and the encrypted file collection ENCFC which are encrypted using a standard symmetric algorithm like AES [44] on the cloud server.
DU is authorized to access the files of DW, he generates a search request (trapdoor Tw) of the (keyword w) and submits it to the CS. Upon receiving the trapdoor Tw from the data user, the server searches over the index SSI, and retrieves the corresponding set of ranked encrypted files. After that, DU can decrypt the files using the shared secret key.
To minimize the communication cost, the data user may send an optional value k along with the trapdoor Tw so that the cloud server only sends back the top-k documents that are most relevant to the search request. Additionally, upon receiving the updated information from DW, the cloud server needs to update the searchable index SSI and file collection FC according to the received information.
In our scheme, we treat the cloud server as an honest-but-curious adversary. In other words, the server follows our proposed algorithm faithfully, but it is anxious to know the keywords, the contents of the encrypted files, and the relevance scores. We suppose that the authorized data users are fully trusted by the data owner and they are authorized to access all the files through search operations. 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SKS-BF SCHEME

Details of the Scheme
In the present paper, we build an inverted index from the file collection FC, to speed up the search process. Also, we employ the Bloom filter to accelerate the search process over this index. On the other side, to simplify the ranking task, we need to upgrade the searchable index SSI to a rank-oriented searchable index. To do that, we attach relevance scores with each keyword-file entry in the searchable index.
Unlike the previous techniques, the data owner ranks the matched documents according to relevance scores, since directly uploading relevance scores will leak lots of significant frequency information against the keyword privacy. Hence, the essential issue here is how we can encrypt these numerical scores while preserving their ability to rank the relevant documents. In our scheme, we closely follow the PEKS algorithm to encrypt the inverted index to avoid leaking the relative order of the relevance scores to the cloud server, except for a slight modification in the structure of PEKS, which involves using the Bloom filter. Additionally, in this scheme, DU can implement top-k retrieval with one round trip for each search request without waiting for the time of two round trips for each search request, this will avoid unnecessary communication cost. Also observe that in this way, CS still knows nothing about the values of the numerical scores, but it learns that the required documents are more relevant than the ones not required.
Our scheme consists of four algorithms: a key generation algorithm Key-Gen, file collection encryption algorithm Enc-FC, an index construction algorithm SSI-Const, a trapdoor generation algorithm Tw-Gen, and a searchable index algorithm SSI-Sear which are scattered among three phases, the data owner phase, the data user phase and the cloud server phase.
Data Owner Phase
This phase includes three algorithms as detailed below: a) Key-Gen(): DW initiates the scheme by using a key generation algorithm Key-Gen which takes the security parameter  which determines the size of Gx and Gy, as input to create the following public parameters PP: r as a large prime number, two groups Gx and Gy of order r, V is a random generator of Gx, a bilinear map ê: G x × G x → G y , three cryptographic hash functions H1, H2, Hbloom, two public keys, one for data owner DWPK and other for data user DUPK , and two secret keys SK: α and β. b) Enc-FC(FC): To protect the file collection privacy, FC should be encrypted before uploading them onto cloud server which is not within their trusted domains. To do that, the data owner executes a file collection encryption algorithm Enc-FC to encrypt each file fFC using AES algorithm [44] . Each file fi comprising of a unique identifier IDi {0, 1} n . c) SSI-Const (PP, FC): The data owner DW runs an index construction algorithm SSI-Const to build a Secure Searchable Index SSI for all searchable keywords W, which are stored at the service provider, which will help DW to perform a keyword search by calling this algorithm. Firstly, the algorithm scans the file collection FC and extracts the distinct keywords W from FC. Then the algorithm constructs the identifier collection of M files in EncFC that contain the keyword wi as FCwi={ID w i f 1 , ID w i f 2 , …,ID w i f M }. For each file in FCwi, SSI-Const algorithm computes a numerical relevance score Sc according to (1) . The computed scores are used to determine which file is more relevant to the corresponding keyword. Next, it attaches the relevance scores with the corresponding files as (ID| Sc w i f j ) and stores them in the Inverted List IL w i . Then, the algorithm sorts each Inverted List IL w i InvLis according to the scores of all the files containing wi.
To secure the relevance scores and the keyword, we apply bilinear maps on elliptic curves [45] : we use two groups Gx and Gy of prime order r and a bilinear map : × → . We also need two hash functions H1 : {0, 1} * Gx and H2 : Gy{0, 1} logr . We use this bilinear map with each relevance scores and keyword wi as Enc-Scwifj = H2(̂ (DUPK , H1( )) and Enc-wi=αH1(wi)V+α(DUPK) respectively. Then, DW stores the Inverted Lists InvLis in SSI. Finally, the data owner sends the SSI and the encrypted documents set EncFC to the cloud server.
On the other hand, to secure the keyword wi in each Inverted List ILwi, DW creates one Bloom filter BF for all keywords: this filter consists of an array of x bits, and uses p independent hash functions h1, …, hp. The filter allows the data owner to perform key-word searches efficiently, but could result in some false positive retrievals. A classical Bloom filter may reveal information about the keyword, since the hash functions are publicly known. So, a suitable solution to create a searchable index using the Bloom filter is to instead index each keyword by its encrypted image. Algorithms 1, 2 and 3 below show the key generation algorithm, file collection encryption algorithm and the index construction algorithm. (1), denoted as Sc w i f j , -store the ID w i f j 's identifier with score Sc w i f j , (ID| Sc w i f j ) in the Inverted List ILwi, * sort the inverted list ILwi according to scores of all files contained wi, * encrypt Sc w i f j as Enc-Sc w i f j = H2(ê( DUPK , H1(Sc wifj α ))), 3: Secure the keyword in each inverted list: -for each ILwi  InvLis, * encrypt wi, set the encrypted keyword as Enc-wi=αH1(wi)V+α(DUPK), * compute R1 = H2(ê (V, V) α ), 4: store the inverted lists InvLis and R1 in SSI 5: send the encrypted files Enc-FC and the index SSI to the server.
Data User Phase
This phase includes one algorithm as detailed below: Tw-Gen(PP, Qw): DU will run a trapdoor generation algorithm Tw-Gen to retrieve only the encrypted files containing keywords, DU will get the public key DOPK and create a set of trapdoors Tw = {tw1, tw2,…, twl} from a set of keywords Qw = {qw1, qw2,…, qwl}. DU will compute the trapdoor of the search request of Qw using his secret key, twi = (H1(qwi)+β) -1 V [45] . Finally, data user submits Tw to the cloud server. Algorithms 4 below show the trapdoor generator algorithm. Algorithm 4-Tw-Gen(PP, Qw) 1: for each qwi  Qw where i  [1, l], 2: compute trapdoor using DU's private key as: twi = (H1(qwi) +β) -1 V, 3: send the generated trapdoors Tw and the corresponding top-k to the server.
Cloud Server Phase
This phase includes one algorithm as detailed below: SSI-Sear (SSI, Tw, k, PP): upon receiving the trapdoor Tw, the server will call the a searchable index algorithm SSI-Sear on the searchable index SSI and return the associated Bloom filter BF, then compute independent hash functions Hd(R1) where d = 1…p and R1 = H2((V,V) α ), and compute Hd(R2) where R2 = H2((twj, Enc-wi) ). Then server tests BF in all p locations. If all p locations of all independent hash functions in BF are 1, the server returns the relevant encrypted files corresponding to twj to DU.
Once DU receives the encrypted files from CS, he/she decrypts each retrieved document Encfi  EncFC using the AES encryption method algorithm. Algorithm 5 below show the search index algorithm. 
SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, we analyse the security characteristics using the scheme we described above. In terms of privacy of the keywords and relevance scores, we construct the scheme based on bilinear pairing to protect the privacy of the trapdoors and relevance scores. Below, we prove the security of the keyword encryption process. Theorem 6.1. The proposed SKS-BF scheme is semantically secure against chosen-keyword attacks under the Bilinear Inverse Diffie-Hellman Problem (BIDHP).
Proof. Let AR be an attacker that wins the security game (breaking the SKS-BF scheme) with an  advantage. Suppose AR makes QrH1 and QrH2 hash function queries and QrT trapdoor queries. Also, we suppose there is an algorithm CH that breaks the BIDH problem with advantage at least ̀, and propose CH is given (r, Gx, Gy, ,V,V). Then CH's goal is to solve a BIDHP. CH interacts with the forger AR in the security game as follows:
At any time, algorithm AR queries the random oracle H1 or H2. 1) H1-queries: To respond to this type of query, the challenger CH maintains H1, a list<Wj,j, Ej>. The list is initially empty. When AR queries Wi from the random oracle H1, and algorithm CH responds as follows: a) If Wi already appears in the list H1, then CH responds with i. Otherwise, CH generates a random coin Ei  {0,1}. If Ei = 0, then CH computes i= bV for a randomly selected b  Z r * , otherwise, Ei = 1, CH selects a random element a and computes i = a-1V. b) In both cases, the challenger adds the tuple < Wi, i , Ei > to the list H1 and responds with H1(Wi) = i. c) When AR requests an encryption of keyword W, Algorithm CH calls the above algorithm to respond to H1-queries to get i  Gx. Then he searches H1 for the keyword Wi. If Ei = 1, then CH aborts. Otherwise, H1(Wi) = bV, and then CH computes Enc Wb * = H1(Wi)X +α DUPK α (bV)V +α DUPK α (bV)V + αβ V α V(bV+β) d) CH can build a searchable index SSI by executing the algorithm SSI-Const(PP, FC). Then it returns the index SSI to AR. 2) -H2-queries: The challenger maintains H2, a list (γ,φ). The list is initially empty. At any time, AR issues a query γ to H2. CH checks whether γ appears in H2 in a pair (γ,φ). If not, the challenger CH picks a random value φ, adds the pair (γ,φ) to H2, and answers AR with H2(γ) = φ. 3) Trapdoor queries: When AR makes a query for the trapdoor of the keyword Wi, CH runs the above algorithm to respond to H1-queries to get i  Gx, then searches the H1-list for the query. If Ei = 1, then CH aborts. Otherwise, H1(Wi) = bV, and then CH computes
where CH does know β, and answers AR with Tw. 4) Challenge: Algorithm AR selects and sends a pair of keywords W0 and W1 to CH on which it wishes to be challenged, and AR must not have asked previously for the trapdoors of any of the words W0 or W1. After receiving (W0, W1) from the attacker, CH calls the above algorithm twice to respond to H1queries to get (W0, 0, E0) and (W1, 1, E1). If both E0 and E1 are 0, then CH reports failure and terminates. Otherwise, CH randomly picks ð  {0,1} such that Eð = 1, and then CH responds with the challenge ciphertext Encw and R1 where R1{0,1}logr C = (Encw, R1). The decryption of the ciphertext is Dec ð * = H2(ê(Tw ð * ,Enc W ð * )) = H2(ê(bV, a-1V)) = H2(ê(V, V) a −1 b ) by the definition Dec ð * = R 1 * . The challenger creates the secure index SSIð by running the algorithm SSI Const(PP, FC) and sends SSIð as a challenge to AR. 5) More queries: After the above challenge query, AR can do additional trapdoor queries, with same restriction that Wi ≠ W0, W1, CH answers these queries as before. 6) Output: Eventually, AR outputs its guess ð ́ {0, 1} for ð.
PERFORMANCE OF OVERALL SKS-BF SYSTEM
In this section, we measure the efficiency of the proposed scheme with MANET resources usability in terms of retrieved data and corresponding energy saving. Also, we evaluate our scheme and compare its performance with PPSE composed in [46] . The entire experiment design is implemented using MATLAB application and NS2 2.3 simulator on a Windows 8 server with an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3032M CPU at 2.60GHz. The bloom filter and encrypted data retrieval was performed with MATLAB, and the entire network design and residual energy calculation were performed with ns2 simulation.
Evaluation Results
To build a secure index with ranked keyword search, an ordinary posting list attaches a relevance score to each posting entry. Our method replaces the original values of scores with the encrypted ones. The size of the posting lists is absolutely linear in the size of the keyword dictionary. The additional bits of encrypted relevance scores are not an important issue because of the cheap storage overhead on cloud servers. On the other hand, our scheme takes a long time to build the secure index; this is because the security of SKS-BF heavily relies on the bilinear pairing operation and operations over elliptical curves. So, we do not discuss the index construction time here, we suppose the data owner has built the secure searchable index already. We focus on the efficiency of the search: after receiving the trapdoor from the user, the server needs to compare the trapdoor with the searchable index. The consumed time is shown in the following figures.
As the encrypted scores are ranked by DW, the cloud server can process the top-k retrieval almost as fast as in the plain text domain. Figure 1 shows our search time overhead against increasing values of k, for the same index with ten queried keywords for different numbers of retrieved files with the same file collection M = 10000, and dictionary keyword N = 4000. In terms of search efficiency evaluation, we compare the search time complexity with the PPSE scheme [46] . The main computation to perform a query in the cloud server consists of computing and ranking the similarity scores for all documents in the dataset and choosing the top-k results from all the scored documents. For SKS-BF, query execution in the cloud server includes one protocol (Locate Keywords and returns the ranked ID list of top-k encrypted files EncF to DU). Figure 2 shows that, given the same number of queried keywords (l = 10) and the same size of data files (M = 10000), when the size of keyword dictionary changes from 4000 to 12000, the time overhead of the search also increases linearly for the scheme PPSE, while it remains constant for SKS-BF. Figure 3 shows that, given the same number of queried keywords (l = 10) and the same size of the keyword dictionary (N = 4000), with different numbers of documents, the time overhead of the search increases linearly for PPSE, while it remains constant for SKS-BF. Furthermore, the search time of SKS-BF is sensitive to the size of the keyword dictionary, and it is insensitive to the size of the dataset, while PPSE suffer a quadratic growth as the size of the dataset increases and the size of the keyword dictionary increases. However, from the discussions above, we can put the conclusions that our technique has less search time consumption than PPSE.
In terms of communication cost which is the core problem of MANET, it is obvious that the proposed method reduces the retrieved files, and accordingly the communication processes saves the node's energy as shown in Figure 4 . The energy overhead decreases linearly. The proposed scheme avoids unnecessary communications, and therefore has highly contributed in energy saving. The simulation environment, as shown in Table 1 , comprise 50 nodes with initial battery power 2000 joule. All the simulation's traces take place at the sending node. SKS-BF takes place in 20 simulation sessions on NS2 for multiples of 500 retrieved files for each search request. Downloading the top-k relevant files from the whole file collection is an important concentration point from MANET developer point view. 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we suggest a novel construction of a public key searchable encryption method. We use the inverted index and Bloom filter to speed up the search processes with a large amount of keywords. The scheme is efficient because it relies on pairing operation on elliptical curve. Because the search pattern has been identified as an important security threat in searchable encryption techniques, the proposed scheme features a probabilistic trapdoor construction algorithm to protect the search pattern. Finally, the experimental and simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme not only properly tackles the secure ranked keyword search issue, but also brings an enhancement in the reduction of data communication through the search and retrieval processes.
